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Abstract: Distinguish contingency in general from anthropic contingency. The former 
is what really could happen; the latter is what really could be observed to happen. 
Quantum histories which host no life cannot, as a matter of obvious necessity, be 
observed. This distinction generates an anthropic observation selection effect, 
which has been employed in response to the fine-tuning argument for the design 
hypothesis. This chapter argues that fine-tuning is a genuine phenomenon that cries 
out for explanation; that in one-world approaches to quantum theory a chancy 
determination of cosmological parameters would render the one universe we are 
in preposterously lucky; that no preposterous luck is required from the perspective 
of quantum modal realism; and that the correct interpretation of quantum 
mechanics turns out to have a significant evidential bearing on the design question. 
 
“I could have been someone 
Well so could anyone.” 
Finer & MacGowan (1988)  
 
6.1  Introduction 
Quantum modal realism is a theory of what really can happen. Yet not everything 
that can happen can be observed to happen. Some of the worlds in the Everett 
multiverse, of course, do involve observers observing reality to be some way; our own 
Everett world is one such world. Other worlds in the Everett multiverse contain no 
observers (whether because conditions in them are inhospitable to life, or because by 




between Everett worlds that host observers and those that do not has epistemic 
consequences: it gives rise to an observation selection effect. In short, we ought not be 
surprised that we do not observe any course of events which cannot be observed. This 
simple point makes a profound difference to how we evaluate the evidential import of 
the fact that we observe conditions in the actual Everett world to be hospitable to life. 
In this chapter my goal is to explore the scope and limits of anthropic reasoning in the 
context of quantum modal realism. Anthropic reasoning seeks to factor observation 
selection effects into the evaluation of the epistemic consequences of our observing the 
kind of world that we see around us. In particular, anthropic reasoning provides a 
powerful response to the well-known fine-tuning argument which uses the apparent extreme 
fragility of life with respect to variations in large-scale features of the cosmos to support 
the conclusion that the cosmos was intentionally designed to permit the evolution of life. 
I shall argue that quantum modal realism provides a new potential way to vindicate 
anthropic reasoning and undercut the fine-tuning argument. This particular vindication 
of anthropic reasoning is unavailable in the context of any approach to quantum theory 
other than EQM, and hence it highlights a surprising way in which the choice of 
interpretation of quantum mechanics bears evidentially on the question of whether 
physical reality was designed. 
The viability of the overall quantum modal realist picture does not depend on any of 
the arguments in this chapter. Still, it is instructive to see how the quantum modal realist 
reconceiving of the nature of contingency has broader ramifications not just for the 
foundations of metaphysics but for epistemology and the philosophy of religion. In 
section 6.2 I reprise the standard dialectic of the fine-tuning argument, and sketch the 
debate over whether multiverse hypotheses can underwrite an anthropic explanation of 
fine-tuning as an alternative to design. Section 6.3 explains a role for multiverse 
hypotheses that differs from that standardly considered: multiverse hypotheses that have 
some independent support from physics may serve as undercutting defeaters with respect to 
the fine-tuning reasoning. Section 6.4 explores different types of multiverse and assesses 
the extent to which they are capable of undercutting fine-tuning, and section 6.5 focuses 
specifically on a potential route to undercutting fine-tuning in the context of EQM which 




surprisingly enough, interpretation of quantum physics is evidentially relevant to the 
question of whether physical reality was designed. 
6.2  The Fine-tuning Argument 
One of the most striking features of contemporary cosmology is that our best theories 
include a number of parameters that are fine-tuned with respect to life. This term has 
various uses; here I shall use it to mean any physical variable such that i) the value of the 
variable is not explained within our best theories and ii) moderate variations in that 
variable give rise to cosmological models where complex life is not physically possible. 
Such variables are sometimes called constants; in this chapter I will refer to them as 
parameters, since whether they are in fact constant is part of what is disputed. 
A number of apparently fine-tuned parameters feature in modern cosmology. Martin 
Rees (2000) identifies six dimensionless parameters: the dimensionality of space (D=3), 
the ratio of the strengths of the gravitational and electromagnetic force (N≈1036), the 
nuclear efficiency of fusion from hydrogen to helium (ε≈0.007), the density parameter 
characterizing the mass distribution in the universe (Ω≈1), the cosmological constant 
(λ≈10-122) and the ratio of the gravitational potential energy of a galaxy cluster to the 
mass-energy of that cluster (Q≈10-5). For a detailed review of the associated physics, see 
Barnes (forthcoming). While some of these parameters appear to be more fine-tuned 
than others, and future theories may yet explain the values of some of them, when taken 
together the fact that the combination of values of all of these parameters appears so 
delicately poised to permit life is very striking, and it at least motivates the search for 
some underlying explanation.  
According to the notorious fine-tuning argument, the evidence of cosmological fine-
tuning provides confirmation for the proposition that there is a designer. The basic 
thought is that fine-tuning evidence would be much less surprising if there is a designer 
than this evidence would be if there is no designer. Fine-tuned universes fit the design 
hypothesis better than they fit the no-design hypothesis, and accordingly a discovery of 





Anthropic reasoning has sometimes been deployed to block the fine-tuning 
argument, by enabling us to resist the thought that fine-tuning evidence would be 
surprising if there was no designer, and hence to deny that there is a disparity in 
surprisingness. But the anthropic response to the fine-tuning argument has been 
influentially criticized. In John Leslie’s vivid analogy (Leslie 1989), you ought to be 
surprised to find yourself alive after a reliable firing squad has attempted to shoot you 
(and you may reasonably infer some unknown cause of their all missing) even if you 
wouldn’t have been around to be unsurprised if they had successfully carried out their 
task. A reliable firing squad all missing is just (we may say, without yet committing to any 
particular analysis of this notion) intrinsically unlikely. The problem with the anthropic 
response is that the occurrence of fine-tuned parameters seems likewise to be highly 
intrinsically unlikely—even though it is not at all unexpected given that such parameters 
are observed. Do not highly intrinsically unlikely events call out for explanation, of the 
kind offered by the design hypothesis? While this reasoning still needs to be made precise 
in various ways, the outline of the fine-tuning argument is clear enough, and it deserves 
to be taken seriously. 
One way of resisting any probability boost to the design hypothesis is to maintain 
that the occurrence of fine-tuned parameters is not an intrinsically unlikely outcome. This 
is where multiverses have often entered the story. Positing the right kind of multiverse, 
one which includes a universe for every possible combination of constant values, seems 
to achieve the required result: it is not intrinsically unlikely that somewhere in that 
multiverse there is a universe with a life-permitting combination of constant values. 
For those disinclined towards design explanations, it has been tempting to reach for 
a multiverse in response to fine-tuning, and regard fine-tuning itself as the evidence for 
the multiverse. However, a well-known objection to the appeal to a multiverse, put 
forward by Hacking (1987) and White (2000), is that it still seems unlikely that this very 
universe—the one we in fact inhabit—has fine-tuned constant values. After all, most 
universes in the multiverse do not. As responsible epistemic agents, we know to take into 
account the whole of our evidence—and our evidence tells us that this universe is fine-
tuned, not merely that some universe is fine-tuned. This logically stronger evidence seems 




This particular universe, we are tempted to reason, had only a minute chance of ending 
up with the right parameters—so you and I had only a minute chance of existing. At least 
on the assumption that the universes are causally isolated, the existence or non-existence 
of lots of other universes doesn’t seem to make any difference to the probability that this 
universe is fine-tuned. Then the existence of a multiverse doesn’t make the fine-tuning 
of our universe more probable, and the evidence that our universe is fine-tuned does not 
support the multiverse hypothesis over the single-universe hypothesis. This argument has 
I think been influential in undermining the credibility of ‘multiverse responses’ to the 
fine-tuning argument within recent epistemology. 
There is currently no consensus on these matters; authors including Bostrom (2002), 
Bradley (2012) have offered a variety of responses to White and Hacking, and Hawthorne 
& Isaacs (2018) respond to a number of other criticisms of the fine-tuning argument. 
Where multiverses have entered the picture, the focus of the debate has tended to be on 
whether someone not committed to the existence of a multiverse should regard fine-
tuning evidence as supporting the hypothesis of a multiverse. In the next section I want 
to focus on a different question: if we take ourselves to have evidence for some 
multiverse theory on independent physical grounds, then how should we think about the 
epistemic import of fine-tuning evidence?  
 
6.3 Multiverse Hypotheses as Undercutting Defeaters 
As far as I know, the question of how fine-tuning reasoning is affected by the 
supposition that a multiverse exists has not been much explored. One exception is Roger 
White who writes, apparently as something of an afterthought to his defence of the 
objection referenced above: 
“the Multiple Universe hypothesis screens off the probabilistic link between the 
Design hypothesis and the fine-tuning data. Hence if we happened to know, on 
independent grounds, that there are many universes, the fine-tuning facts would 




our knowledge of the existence of many universes would render the fine-tuning of 
our universe unsurprising.” 
White (2000, p.273-274) 
To put White’s point another way: independent evidence for a suitable multiverse is an 
undercutting defeater for the design hypothesis. Such evidence does not weigh directly 
against the existence of a designer, as a rebutting defeater would (perhaps the problem 
of evil is a candidate rebutting defeater for the fine-tuning argument, given some extra 
premises about the likely nature of a designer?); rather, evidence from physics in favour 
of an appropriate multiverse is ipso facto higher-order evidence that fine-tuning evidence 
does not support the existence of a designer. 
We may use the familiar analogy of misleading lighting. An object looks red to us (a 
fine-tuned universe looks designed) so we conclude that it is red (so we conclude there 
is a designer); but, once we are informed that the object is being illuminated with red light 
(once we are informed that there is a multiverse), we recognize that we now ought to 
revert to our prior expectations about the object’s colour (we now ought to revert to our 
prior expectation about whether there is a designer). Higher-order evidence about the 
misleading lighting screens off the evidential relevance of our perceptual experience to 
the object’s colour. (Information about the existence of the multiverse screens off the 
evidential relevance of the fine-tuning evidence to the existence of a designer.) 
There are numerous interesting open questions about exactly how undercutting 
defeat works, raised in recent work by Lasonen-Aarnio, Sturgeon and others. Does it 
work by providing reasons for positive higher-order beliefs about causal or other 
explanatory relationships between the posited phenomenon and our possession of the 
evidence that seems to count in favour of that phenomenon? Or does it work purely by 
pruning away features of our epistemic states, without itself providing us with any 
positive reason for belief in any proposition? On the former model, the independent 
evidence that there is a multiverse provides new positive reason to believe the higher-
order thesis: that the evidence that this universe is fine-tuned fails to support the thesis 
that there is a designer. On the latter model, the independent evidence that there is a 
multiverse merely cuts away some structure within our epistemic states, eliminating the 




undercutting defeat can and should be rendered in a Bayesian framework (see e.g. 
Weisberg 2015). We need not pursue these questions here. What concerns us is which 
sorts of multiverses are capable of acting as undercutting defeaters and why; we can set 
aside the nature of undercutting defeat, and its proper representation within formal 
epistemology. 
Before we look in more detail at the kinds of multiverses for which there might be 
independent evidence, and assess whether they really do act as undercutting defeaters for 
the evidence from fine-tuning, it is worth observing that the posit of a multiverse for 
reasons independent of fine-tuning reasons does not eliminate the evidential import of 
fine-tuning altogether. Even if evidence of fine-tuning does not support the multiverse 
hypothesis, and even if the multiverse hypothesis screens off the support provided by 
the fine-tuning evidence for the existence of a designer, the evidence of fine-tuning may 
still support other surprising conclusions. By analogy, your having an experience as of a 
red object may support some potentially surprising conclusions even if it does not 
support the misleading-lighting hypothesis, and even if the misleading-lighting hypothesis 
screens off its support for the red-object hypothesis. For example, it may support the 
hypothesis that the inhabitant of the room likes the colour red, or it may support the 
hypothesis that you can see in colour. 
So: what should multiverse proponents regard as the evidential import of fine-tuning 
evidence? It goes without saying that the answer depends on which kind of multiverse is 
posited. Physicists do not multiply universes first and ask questions about what those 
universes are like later, even if this impression might be gained from certain philosophical 
work on the topic. Rather, they posit certain kinematical structures and dynamical laws 
in order to explain observed physical phenomena, and then ask questions about whether 
these physical posits give rise to multiplicities of universes. There is no general argument 
to be found in physics for the existence of a multiverse of some kind or other; there are 





6.4 Which multiverses can undercut fine-tuning? 
Max Tegmark’s classification of multiverses into levels (Tegmark 2003) is coarse-
grained, but it provides a useful starting point: 
 Level 1: Multiplicity of regions of a single spacetime, spatio-temporally distant from 
one another. All regions share the same physical parameters. 
 Level 2: Multiplicity of regions of a single spacetime, spatio-temporally distant from 
one another. Regions differ in their physical parameters. 
 Level 3: Multiplicity of quantum-mechanical worlds, as in EQM. 
 Level 4: Multiplicity of complete possible physical realities, as in Lewisian modal 
realism. 
Level 1 multiverses are spatially infinite universes which are ergodic in the sense that 
everything happens somewhere: all physically possible dynamical processes are to be 
found somewhere within such a universe. If you were to travel far enough within a Level 
1 multiverse, you would eventually come across another region of space with 
indiscernible contents to our own region—for any arbitrarily large region of space around 
us that one may want to consider. For the limiting case of an Hubble volume indiscernible 
from our own, Tegmark estimates one would expect to travel 1010115 metres before finding 
one. Still, if we live in a Level 1 multiverse, duplicates of our Hubble volume are certainly 
out there somewhere. Various theories of cosmic inflation seem to predict a Level 1 
multiverse; but the details will not matter for our purposes. This is because knowledge 
of the existence of a Level 1 multiverse would not, after all, screen off the evidential 
relevance of a fine-tuned universe to the existence of a designer. 
Why not? Because all regions in a Level 1 multiverse have the same values of the 
parameters that are at issue in the fine-tuning argument. Either all regions have parameter 
values congenial to life (even though not all of them will actually contain life, of course) 
or no regions do. Evidently, since we exist, if we do live in a Level 1 multiverse then we 
live in one in which all of the worlds have suitable parameter values for life. The existence 




way that a single fine-tuned Hubble volume would; even if a fine-tuned multiverse is no 
less likely than a fine-tuned universe, it certainly does not seem any more likely. So the 
fine-tuning evidence remains highly surprising even on the supposition that we live in a 
Level 1 multiverse, and the existence of such a multiverse is not an undercutting defeater 
for the fine-tuning argument for a designer. 
Level 2 multiverses are a different story. While they are like Level 1 multiverses in 
that they consist in single infinite spacetimes with different phenomena in different 
regions, Level 2 multiverses have different values of the parameters in different regions—
and typically they are also assumed to be ergodic in our rough sense: all physically possible 
states of affairs—including all physically possible combinations of parameters—occur 
somewhere in some region of the multiverse. Hence Level 2 multiverses are capable of 
acting as undercutting defeaters for the support that fine-tuning evidence provides for a 
designer. If there is a Level 2 multiverse, then there are certain to be infinitely many 
different regions of spacetime that have appropriate parameter values for life, and—given 
that we ourselves are alive—it is no surprise that we observe a region of that kind. 
Whether Bradley or White is right in their assessment of the nature of the maximal 
relevant evidence—that this universe is suitable for life, or that we inhabit a universe 
suitable for life—in a Level 2 multiverse there is guaranteed to be a universe that is 
indiscernible from this one, so our maximal relevant evidence is guaranteed to be received 
somewhere. That we receive such evidence is accordingly neither unsurprising nor 
unlikely given that there exists a Level 2 multiverse.  
By construction, Level 1 multiverses do not undercut the fine-tuning argument and 
Level 2 multiverses do. It is part of what it is to be a Level 1 multiverse that parameters 
do not vary across regions, and part of what it is to be a Level 2 multiverses that 
parameters do so vary. The non-trivial question that remains is whether we have any 
reason to think we live in a Level 2 multiverse, and hence any reason to think that the 
fine-tuning argument really is undercut. While the theories of cosmic inflation that lead 
to a Level 1 multiverse are relatively mainstream, the theories that generate Level 2 
multiverses are much more speculative. A variety of mechanisms for generating such 
multiverses have been considered—for example, Linde’s chaotic inflation model (Linde 




(Smolin 1997) but each proposed mechanism, goes well beyond the orthodox Λ-CDM 
cosmology that is currently favoured by most cosmologists. 
It is safe to say that is an open theoretical question whether there is a Level 2 
multiverse. Our situation is thus like that someone who has seen an object that looks red, 
but who has also been warned that misleading lighting is a live possibility. On the 
supposition that there is misleading lighting, the evidential support of the red appearances 
for the thesis that the object is red is undercut; on the supposition that there is not 
misleading lighting, that evidential support is not undercut. In such a circumstance it is 
presumably rational to reduce one’s confidence that the object is in fact red below the 
level of confidence usually associated with red appearances when no suspicions have 
been raised, but to maintain that confidence above one’s base-line expectation that the 
object is red prior to any observation of it whatever. Likewise, the evidence of fine-tuning 
ought to raise our confidence that there is a designer above the baseline, but this 
confidence ought to stay below the level that the fine-tuning evidence would establish in 
the absence of any suspicions of a multiverse. The more confidence we have in a Level 
2 multiverse, the more confident we should be that the fine-tuning evidence is undercut 
and the closer our confidence in a designer should be to its baseline level. 
 
6.5 Everett Multiverses as Undercutting Defeaters 
I now want to turn to the main target of my discussion: the consequences of the 
existence of a Level 3 multiverse for the evidential force of fine-tuning evidence. The 
Level 3 multiverse is the multiverse of EQM, and it contains an Everett world for every 
physically possible course of events. Unlike Level 1 and Level 2 multiverses, the universes 
of the Everettian multiverse are not different regions within a single infinite spacetime. 
If there is at least one Level 2 multiverse and in addition EQM is correct, then there is a 





In chapters 2 and 3 I defended a diverging version of EQM on grounds related to the 
interpretation of objective probability. The distinction between overlap and divergence 
is largely orthogonal to our present concern, however. This is because which qualitative 
possibilities are realized in the Everettian multiverse does not depend on how these 
qualitative possibilities are mereologically structured. Whether divergence or overlap is 
correct, there either are Everett worlds containing a variety of combinations of parameter 
values or there are not. If there are such worlds, then the Everettian multiverse undercuts 
the evidential import of fine-tuning for a designer. If there are not such worlds, then the 
Everettian multiverse does not undercut the fine-tuning argument. 
An Everettian multiverse’s ability to undercut the fine-tuning argument depends only 
on the existence of worlds in it with appropriate parameter values; it doesn’t matter for 
our present purposes of assessing the fine-tuning argument how these worlds are 
mereologically related. What does matter for our purposes, however, is whether the 
worlds of a Level 3 multiverse include worlds in which there are a suitable variety of 
combinations of parameter values to make it unsurprising that there are life-permitting 
combinations. It is characteristic of Everettian multiverses that they include worlds 
corresponding to all physically possible outcomes of indeterministic quantum-
mechanical processes. That is, if there is a non-zero quantum-mechanical chance of some 
outcome—no matter how small—then there is an Everett world in which that outcome 
occurs. Hence our question becomes: is there a quantum-mechanical chance, no matter 
how small, of the parameter values taking all of the combinations needed to make the 
existence of a world with life-permitting parameter values unsurprising? Are there 
indeterministic dynamical processes that assign non-zero quantum-mechanical chances 
both to combinations of parameter values that are life-permitting and to combinations 
that are not, such that the overall range of parameters permitted is of a kind that is not 
suggestive of divine design? 
A toy example may help clarify matters. Suppose that only one parameter is 
involved—call it Z—and suppose that Z may take any integer value from 1 to 100. Only 
a Z value of 77 is compatible with life. A Z value of 77 is observed. Prima facie, this whole 
body of evidence tends in the context of a single-universe cosmology to support the 




correct, and that there exists a quantum-mechanically chancy process which determines 
the value of Z. There will then be Everett worlds with each of the physically possible 
values of Z. Now consider four different hypotheses about the chancy process which 
fixes the value of Z: 
• Process A: The quantum probability of Z taking value 4 is 50%, and the quantum 
probability of Z taking value 77 is 50%. All other values get zero probability. 
• Process B: The quantum probability of Z taking value n is 0.01% for each integer 
n from 1 to 100 except for n=77; the quantum probability of Z taking value 77 is 99.01%.  
• Process C: The quantum probability of Z taking value n is 1% for each integer n 
from 1 to 100.  
• Process D: The quantum probability of Z taking value n is (n/50.5)% for each 
integer n from 1 to 100.  
Which of these processes gives rise to an Everettian multiverse capable of 
undercutting the toy fine-tuning argument based on the value of Z? 
Process A does not give rise to a suitable multiverse. Even though it guarantees that 
there will be an Everett world with a life-conducive value of Z, this is not enough to 
undercut the support that is provided for the designer hypothesis. This is because life-
conducive parameter values continue to play an unexplained and unexpected role in the 
theory. On the supposition that two specific values of n play an unexplained and basic 
role in the theory, it remains very unlikely that 77 will be one of these values, and hence 
that life will be possible at all in our toy multiverse; given an even prior probability 
distribution over which pair of Z values are physically possible, the probability of one of 
these values being 77 is only 2%. So there would still be a significant boost in this toy 
scenario for the divine design hypothesis. 
Process B also does not give rise to a suitable multiverse. Although all values of Z are 
now rendered physically possible, so there will be an Everett world with each of the 
values, there is still something distinguished and special about the life-supporting value 




explanation for this fact from within the theory. So there would still be a significant boost 
in this toy scenario for the divine design hypothesis. 
Process C does give rise to a suitable multiverse. The particular Z value that is 
conducive to life does not play any special role in the theory; it is not distinguished in any 
way from the other parameter values, so there is no basis for the hypothesis that a 
designer had any hand in so distinguishing it. If we were informed that Process B was 
part of the physics of our toy multiverse, then the toy argument for a designer from the 
apparent fine-tuning of Z would be undercut. 
Process D also does give rise to a suitable multiverse. As with Process C, the particular 
Z value that is conducive to life does not play any special role in the theory. The 
probability distribution over Z values may not be uniform, but nor is it tilted in particular 
towards life-conducive Z values. What makes a universe more likely to be the outcome 
of the initial chance process, in this scenario, is just higher Z value. It is true that the life-
supporting Z value is towards the higher end of the spectrum, but—as far as I can see—
this fact by itself provides no significant boost to the designer hypothesis. 
Note that given Processes A and B, the Everettian multiverse does not fail to 
undercut the designer hypothesis because a designer is needed to explain why the actual 
world we observe has suitable parameters. Rather, Processes A and B seem to invite the 
hypothesis of a designer to explain why the theory itself has certain properties that are 
correlated with life-conduciveness. The probabilification of a designer is not based on 
the observed parameter values being unlikely except if there is a designer, but instead is 
based on the way in which these observed parameter values are selected by an underlying 
causal mechanism being unlikely except if there is a designer. That alters the nature of 
the fine-tuning argument, but it does not change the ultimate upshot: a probability boost 
for a designer. 
So: which of these types of scenario is actual, if EQM is correct and we are in fact 
living in an Everettian multiverse? The somewhat deflationary provisional conclusion of 
this chapter is that it is simply too early to tell. We do not know enough about the physics 
of the very early universe to know whether there were any dynamical processes relevant 




progress over the coming decades in quantum gravity research to shed some light on 
these questions. 
Candidate approaches to quantum gravity do already include appropriate candidate 
dynamical processes. In particular, as discussed in section 4.7, the landscape model 
emerging from recent work on string theory provides a mechanism by which an unstable 
high-dimensional spacetime state evolves into one of a staggeringly large number of 
different compactifications, each corresponding to a lower-dimensional spacetime 
characterized by a different combination of parameters. This evolution is a unitary 
quantum process, so there is guaranteed to be an Everett world (with its attached 
objective chance) that corresponds to each of the possible compactifications. And in each 
of these minima of the string landscape, an enormous multiplicity of parallel worlds will 
witness all of the different physically possible processes that play out in each of the 
resulting compactified spacetimes. The string landscape multiverse would make our 
obtaining fine-tuning evidence entirely unsurprising. Likewise, in other approaches to 
quantum gravity, it may reasonably be expected that some cosmological parameters may 
have their values dynamically determined; time will tell. 
Fortunately, we can draw some epistemic lessons from the preceding discussion even 
in the absence of a well-confirmed theory of quantum gravity. If neither the activity of a 
dynamical process of the Process C/Process D sort, nor the design of a designer, was 
responsible for the actual parameter values, then our evidence of fine-tuning looks 
extremely unlikely even on the assumption that EQM is correct. So on the assumption 
that there is an Everettian multiverse, and taking into account the fine-tuned parameter 
values that are actually observed, there is strong support for the disjunctive hypothesis 
that either a life-neutral dynamical process akin to Process C and D fixed the values of 
the parameters in our own (region of our) Everett world or a designer was involved in 
setting the distribution of parameter values across Everett worlds. 
Although I have argued that Everettians ought to be very confident in the above 
disjunction, it remains open for other doxastic commitments to tip the balance of 
likelihood towards one or other of these disjuncts. For example, an Everettian with very 




in the life-neutral-parameter-fixing-dynamical-process disjunct, while an Everettian with 
prior theistic commitments is likely to become more confident in the divine-designer 




Close attention to specific fundamental cosmological hypotheses, and in particular to 
candidate dynamical processes that might give rise to variation in parameter value, is 
necessary to settle the status of the fine-tuning argument. The fine-tuning argument 
might be undercut by future cosmological discoveries in two main ways. Either future 
physics may unearth evidence of a Level 2 multiverse, or future physics may unearth 
evidence of life-neutral dynamical processes that operate to fix parameter values and, in 
conjunction with EQM, generate a Level 3 multiverse with different parameter values in 
different Everett worlds.  
EQM, while not itself undercutting the fine-tuning argument, does nevertheless 
provide a cosmological framework suitable to host dynamical processes by which the 
fine-tuning argument might be undercut. This potential route to undercutting the fine-
tuning argument is distinct from (though compatible with) to the route to undercutting 
the fine-tuning argument that goes via a Level 2 multiverse. A suitable dynamical 
parameter-fixing process need not give rise to a Level 2 multiverse in order to undercut 
the fine-tuning argument—though it might well give rise to one, for example if the string 
landscape hypothesis is combined with EQM. We may conclude that there is at least one 
additional route to undercutting the fine-tuning argument that is available to Everettians 
but not to non-Everettians. Perhaps surprisingly, then, choice between interpretations of 
quantum mechanics turns out to be indirectly evidentially relevant to the existence of a 
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